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THE SECRETS WE KEEP. . . :
ENCRYPTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE 
REFORM
Ian Williams*
Vulnerabilities within pieces of software can expose otherwise secure 
data to outside parties. Such vulnerabilities are exploited not just by 
malicious actors looking to exploit secured data for criminal reasons, 
but also by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Government 
agencies have cultivated vulnerabilities as investigative tools and 
cyber weapons, and at times keep the vulnerabilities they have 
discovered secret from both the companies that produced the software 
and the consumers who rely upon it. While the US Government has 
created a vulnerability disclosure system to help decide when to keep a 
vulnerability secret, it does not do enough to balance the government’s 
national security and law enforcement interests with the data security 
interests of the public. As debates over government access to encrypted 
data continue, a strong legal framework for deciding when and how 
government actors can keep vulnerabilities secret must be established.
I.  Introduction
Like any product created by humans, software is never perfect. Imper-
fections in a piece of software can affect a program in a myriad of ways, but 
few are more problematic than those that affect the security of a computer 
program or system. In computer security, these “software vulnerabilities”
are defined as any “programming mistake that allows an adversary access”
into a computer system.1 With knowledge of a vulnerability, malicious ac-
* Fellow for the Law & Mobility Program, University of Michigan Law School. J.D. 
2018, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Gautam Hans, not only for shep-
herding the initial research that lead to this piece, but for being a friend and mentor. Thank 
you also to Professor Evan Caminker, for his notes and guidance. Finally, thank you to the 
staff of MTLR, for overlooking my tyrannical reign as their EIC when they agreed to continue 
working with me and publish this piece.
This piece was originally written in December of 2017. It is a snapshot of the discussed 
issues at that time—unfortunately technology often moves quickly, and there are develop-
ments in both case law and public policy since that time that are left undiscussed. Readers are 
encouraged to use this note as a primer for their own exploration of these issues.
1. Bruce Schneier, Disclosing vs. Hoarding Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(May 22, 2014, 6:15 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/
disclosing_vs_h.html. 
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tors can create “exploits,” pieces of software that use a given vulnerability 
to their own advantage, often to circumvent standard security measures like 
passwords or encryption and provide a backdoor into a system.2 The closest 
most users will get to these vulnerabilities is when they download updates to 
their programs, many of which are “patches” intended to fix vulnerabilities. 
Of course, depending on the age and sophistication of the system, patching 
vulnerabilities can be difficult and often requires some effort on the part of 
developers and users to be effective.3 Often, however, the biggest stumbling 
block on the path toward fixing a vulnerability is not designing a patch or 
convincing end users to download updates, but rather is finding out the vul-
nerability exists in the first place.  Vulnerabilities that have yet to be discov-
ered by a program’s developer or end user are known as “zero-day vulnera-
bilities,” as the developer in question has had zero days to patch the problem 
and users have equally had zero days to implement the patch or other pro-
tective moves.4
Developers are naturally keen to find and patch such zero-day vulnera-
bilities and often rely on security researchers and “white hat” hackers to as-
sist in that work.5 To entice third-parties to help find vulnerabilities, many 
developers and organizations sponsor “bug bounties,” with the promise of 
fame (via public credit for finding the issue) and fortune (via hard cash or 
items of value like frequent flyer miles) for those who uncover vulnerabili-
ties.6 In 2017 alone, bug bounty payouts totaled more than $6 million, a 
211% increase from the total payouts in 2016,7 and bug bounty programs 
had been launched not only by major tech companies like Google,8 Mi-
2. Dave Piscitello, Threats, Vulnerabilities and Exploits—oh my!, ICANN: BLOG
(Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/threats-vulnerabilities-and-exploits-oh-my
(“Not all exploits involve software, and it’s incorrect to classify all exploit-based attacks as 
hacking. Scams - socially engineering an individual or employee into disclosing personal or 
sensitive information - are an age-old kind of exploit that does not require hacking skills.”).
3. Steven M. Bellovin, Patching is Hard, SMBLOG (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog//2017-05/2017-05-12.html.
4. ARI SCHWARTZ & ROB KNAKE, GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN VULNERABILITY 
DISCLOSURE 3 (2016), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/
vulnerability-disclosure-web-final3.pdf [hereinafter SCHWARTZ & KNAKE].
5. See G. Burningham, The Rise of White Hat Hackers and the Bug Bounty Ecosys-
tem, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/white-hat-
hackers-keep-bug-bounty-421357.html.
6. BUGCROWD INC., THE STATE OF THE BUG BOUNTY 4 (June 2016), 
https://ww2.bugcrowd.com/rs/453-IJC-858/images/state-of-bug-bounty-2016.pdf?utm_
source=website&utm_medium=resources_page&utm_content=state-of-bug-bounty-2016.
7. BUGCROWD INC., 2017 STATE OF THE BUG BOUNTY REPORT 1 (2017), 
https://ww2.bugcrowd.com/rs/453-IJC-858/images/Bugcrowd-2017-State-of-Bug-Bounty-
Report.pdf?utm_source=website&utm_medium=resources_page&utm_content=Bugcrowd-
2017-State-of-Bug-Bounty-Report.
8. Google Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) Rules, GOOGLE APPLICATION 
SECURITY, https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/ (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017).
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crosoft,9 Facebook,10 and PayPal11 but also “real-world” companies like 
United Airlines.12 In 2016, the Department of Defense ran a pilot program 
bug bounty that “exceeded all expectations,” with 138 unique vulnerabilities 
being discovered within the Department’s computer systems.13 These pro-
grams are part of a greater vulnerability disclosure ecosystem that includes 
paid bounties and other unpaid reporting schemes.14
Zero-day vulnerabilities have also attracted interest from civilian gov-
ernment actors, as they offer a valuable tool for criminal investigations and 
espionage. The utility of these vulnerabilities leaves governments in a pre-
carious situation—should they protect end users by revealing the vulnerabil-
ities, thereby allowing developers to patch them, or should they keep them 
secret to serve the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies? By 
keeping a zero-day vulnerability secret, government agencies can retain 
them as novel means of accessing a suspect or intelligence target’s comput-
er, as a target will be unaware that any security flaw exists. In August of 
2016, the precarious nature of this situation played out in full view of the 
public, as a group of hackers calling themselves the “Shadow Brokers” be-
gan advertising that it had stolen a number of exploits from the NSA.15 In 
May of 2017 some of those exploits were used (possibly by North Korean 
hackers) as part of the “WannaCry” ransomware attack that struck at com-
puters worldwide.16 The situation was further complicated in November of 
2017, when the White House released details on a new “Vulnerabilities Eq-
uities Policy and Process” (VEP) for the US government, detailing how and 
when vulnerabilities discovered by government entities would be made pub-
lic.17
The fight over vulnerability disclosure plays out across the backdrop of 
a long-running debate over government access to secured information. As 
9. Microsoft Bug Bounty Program, MICROSOFT, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/
security/dn425036 (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
10. Information, FACEBOOK (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/whitehat.
11. PayPal Bug Bounty Program, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/
security-tools/reporting-security-issues (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
12. United Airlines bug bounty program, UNITED, https://www.united.com/web/en-
US/content/contact/bugbounty.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
13. HACK THE PENTAGON, HACKERONE, https://www.hackerone.com/resources/
hack-the-pentagon (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
14. See Bug Bounty List, BUGCROWD, https://www.bugcrowd.com/bug-bounty-list/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
15. Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow Brokers?, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/shadow-brokers/527778/.
16. See Olivia Solon, WannaCry ransomware has links to North Korea, cybersecurity 
experts say, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/may/15/wannacry-ransomware-north-korea-lazarus-group.
17. See THE WHITE HOUSE, Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United 
States Government (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF [hereinafter 
2017 VEP].
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computer security and encryption have grown stronger, the US government 
has sought means to break that security and retain the access to communica-
tions (for both intelligence purposes and criminal investigation) that it had 
in the pre-digital era. In the 1990s, this played out in the “Crypto Wars,” a
series of policy and legal battles between the government and technology 
advocates, which ended with the government loosening restrictions on cryp-
tographic technology and abandoning attempts to force hardware developers 
to include government backdoors into their products.18 However, as encryp-
tion technology has become more advanced and more commonplace,19 fig-
ures in the law enforcement20 and intelligence communities21 have begun to 
raise the issue of requiring backdoors once more.
The issues around vulnerability disclosures and government backdoors 
are complicated and expansive, and it would be presumptuous, if not fool-
hardy, to claim this paper will cover them all. What it will do is look at 
these two important issues through the lens of two recent court cases to see 
how these issues have begun to play out in the legal system. Part I will ex-
pand on the issues of vulnerability disclosure and use by government and 
explore what implications those issues have on prosecutions by looking at 
the Playpen cases—where the FBI used a software vulnerability within the 
Firefox browser to hack into a website distributing child pornography. Part 
II will then explore the San Bernardino iPhone case, where the FBI attempt-
ed to force Apple into creating a backdoor into the iPhone’s encryption and 
the case’s relationship to the greater debate over government-mandated 
backdoors. Part III will explore recently enacted and proposed solutions to 
these conflicts, including the new VEP. Finally, Part IV will propose a hy-
brid solution that attempts to provide a balance between the competing in-
terests involved.
18. DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY? LESSONS FROM THE 
CRYPTO WARS OF THE 1990S 1 (June 2015), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3407-
doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/
Crypto%20Wars_ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Joe Miller, Google and Apple to Introduce Default Encryption, BBC
NEWS (Sept.19, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29276955.
20. James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public 
Safety on a Collison Course?, Remarks to the Brookings Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-
a-collision-course.
21. See Tom McCarthy, NSA Director Defends Plan to Maintain ‘Backdoors’ into 
Technology Companies, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2015, 3:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-into-technology-companies.
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II.  Vulnerability Disclosures, Government Stockpiles, and the 
Playpen Cases
The pursuit and exploitation of vulnerabilities have existed since the 
dawn of the modern era of computing. In 1988, the “Morris Worm” became 
the first publicized use of a computer worm (a program that copies itself 
from computer to computer), and it was able to infect about 6,000 of the 
60,000 hosts linked to the then-nascent internet.22 At the time, network ad-
ministrators did little to protect their systems and gave little thought to 
online attacks.23 The worm’s architect, a Cornell graduate student named 
Robert Morris, had created the worm not out of malice, but rather intellectu-
al curiosity, though that did not stop him from becoming the first person
prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).24
The Morris Worm was a wakeup call to both industry and government 
that malicious actors could exploit software vulnerabilities to weaken or 
break computer networks. In November of 1988 the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) and Carnegie Mellon University formed 
the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT-
CC), which continues to this day to alert “U.S. industry and computer users 
worldwide to potential threats to the security of their systems” and provide 
“information about how to avoid, minimize, or recover from the damage.”25
Private industry likewise saw the necessity of pursuing vulnerabilities, with 
Netscape launching the first bug bounty program in 1995.26
As more researchers began to hunt for vulnerabilities, experts began 
developing three general categories governing when and to whom a vulner-
ability should be revealed:
Full disclosure—Full details are released [publicly] as soon as 
possible, often without vendor involvement
Coordinated disclosure—Researcher and vendor work together 
so that the bug is fixed before the vulnerability is disclosed
22. See Timeline of Computer History—1988, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, 
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/1988/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
23. See Timothy B. Lee, How a Grad Student Trying to Build the First 
Botnet Brought the Internet to its Knees, WASH. POST
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/11/01/
how-a-grad-student-trying-to-build-the-first-botnet-brought-the-internet-to-its-knees/?utm_
term=.fa24b99bbb89.
24. See id.
25. Byron Spice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Partnership with 
Carnegie Mellon’s CERT Coordination Center, CARNEGIE MELLON U. (Sept. 15, 2003), 
https://www.cs.cmu.edu/news/us-department-homeland-security-announces-partnership-
carnegie-mellons-cert-coordination-center.
26. See Esben Friis-Jensen, The History of Bug Bounty Programs, COBALT (Apr. 10, 
2014), https://blog.cobalt.io/the-history-of-bug-bounty-programs-50def4dcaab3.
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Private or Non-Disclosure—The vulnerability is released to a 
small group of people (not the vendor) or kept private27
Upon discovering a vulnerability, a researcher can choose to release its de-
tails on their own (full disclosure), work with the software’s vendor to fix 
the problem before making it public, or can choose to keep the information 
to itself, the latter of which (unless the vulnerability is later discovered by 
the vendor) leaves users at risk. From these three basic categories develop-
ers and corporations have spun a diverse web of policies, each with unique 
requirements and timetables.28
A. Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
From 1988 and onward the government remained involved in public-
facing vulnerability disclosure via CERT-CC, but it would not be until 2008 
that the national security apparatus began to give the issue any attention.29
On January 8, 2008, President George W. Bush signed National Security 
Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD-54), which was intended to give direction 
for federal cybersecurity operations.30 This order led to the development of 
the “Commercial and Government Information Technology and Industrial 
Control Product or System Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process”
(VEP), a policy detailed in a document dated February 16, 2010, which was 
only partially declassified to the public in January of 2016.31 The 2010 VEP 
applied to vulnerabilities that were “newly discovered and not publicly 
known,”32 and did not apply to vulnerabilities discovered in the course of 
open and unclassified research.33 The policy noted that “the discovery of 
vulnerabilities ‘may present competing equities for [US government] offen-
sive and defensive mission interests,’ ”34 and thus “actions taken in response 
to knowledge of a specific vulnerability must be coordinated to ensure the 
needs of each of these ‘equities’ are addressed.”35 When a government enti-
ty identifies a vulnerability, the entity is tasked with reporting it to the “Ex-
ecutive Secretariat,” a position assigned to the National Security Agency 
27. Brad Antoniewicz, Approaches to Vulnerability Disclosure, OPEN SECURITY RES.
(June 24, 2014), http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2014/06/approaches-to-vulnerability-
disclosure.html.
28. See id.
29. SCHWARTZ & KNAKE, supra note 4, at 4.
30. See National Security Presidential Directive, NSPD-54 (Jan. 8, 2008), 
https://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/EPIC-FOIA-NSPD54.pdf.
31. See EFF v. NSA, ODNI—Vulnerabilities FOIA, EFF, https://www.eff.org/
cases/eff-v-nsa-odni-vulnerabilities-foia (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
32. COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
CONTROL PRODUCT OR SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS 5 (Feb. 
16, 2010), https://www.eff.org/document/vulnerabilities-equities-process-january-2016.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
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Information Assurance Directorate.36 The Executive Secretariat facilitates 
the flow of information about the new vulnerability to VEP “Points of Con-
tact” within a number of government agencies.37 If these agencies believe 
they have an equity at stake in the vulnerability, they will then take part, via 
subject matter experts assigned by each agency, in a multiagency discussion 
regarding the vulnerability, which will then lead to a recommendation to an 
Equities Review Board38 (another multiagency body).39
The 2010 VEP report, and the secret process it created, began to come 
to light in 2014 after the public exposure of a major encryption vulnerabil-
ity. In April of that year, computer security researchers revealed that a major 
security vulnerability, which they named “Heartbleed,” existed within the 
OpenSSL software that many websites used to encrypt traffic.40 The vulner-
ability exploited the connection process between a computer and an en-
crypted website, allowing hackers to bleed off data (including passwords 
and usernames) from what should have been secure systems.41 News reports 
began to circulate that the NSA had been aware of the vulnerability for two 
years, based on unnamed sources who claimed the vulnerability had become 
a “basic part of the agency’s toolkit for stealing account passwords and oth-
er common tasks.”42 The controversy led the Obama Administration to pub-
licize the existence of the VEP, admitting that “building up a huge stockpile 
of undisclosed vulnerabilities while leaving the Internet vulnerable and the 
American people unprotected would not be in our national security inter-
est.”43 They even provided a list of questions typically asked when consider-
ing the withholding of a vulnerability:
How much is the vulnerable system used in the core internet in-
frastructure, in other critical infrastructure systems, in the U.S. 
economy, and/or in national security systems?
Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose significant 
risk?
36. Id. at 3–5. 
37. Id. at 3. 
38. Id. at 3–4.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Kim Zetter, Has the NSA Been Using the Heartbleed Bug as an Internet Peephole?,
WIRED (Apr. 10, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/04/nsa-heartbleed/.
41. Id.
42. Kim Zetter, Report: NSA Exploited Heartbleed to Siphon Passwords for Two Years,
WIRED (Apr. 11, 2014, 4:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/04/nsa-exploited-heartbleed-
two-years/.
43. Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabili-
ties, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2014/04/28/heartbleed-understanding-when-we-disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities.
112 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:105
How much harm could an adversary nation or criminal group 
do with knowledge of this vulnerability?
How likely is it that we would know if someone else was ex-
ploiting it?
How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get 
from exploiting the vulnerability?
Are there other ways we can get it?
Could we utilize the vulnerability for a short period of time be-
fore we disclose it?
How likely is it that someone else will discover the vulnerabil-
ity?
Can the vulnerability be patched or otherwise mitigated?44
The White House further stated that the process was “biased toward respon-
sibly disclosing the vulnerability.”45 They did not, however, release the 2010 
VEP document, which was released only after a FOIA request and legal bat-
tle between the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the NSA, and the Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).46
In 2016, the danger of vulnerability stockpiles became painfully clear, 
as a major security breach by a hacker organization called the “Shadow 
Brokers” released NSA-held vulnerabilities across the internet.47 The Shad-
ow Brokers released several different caches of NSA exploits, which target-
ed network routers, email servers, and the Windows operating system.48 The 
Microsoft exploits were mainly older vulnerabilities, many of which had al-
ready been patched, though they would still be of use against unpatched sys-
tems.49 The leak of these tools threw the NSA into turmoil, as the agency 
struggled to rebuild its arsenal while investigating the source of the leaked 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. EFF v. NSA, ODNI—Vulnerabilities, FOIA, supra note 31. 
47. See Schneier, supra note 15.
48. Id.
49. Tim Cushing, Latest Exploit Dump by Shadow Brokers Contains 
Easy-to-Use Windows Exploits, Most Already Patched by Microsoft, TECHDIRT
(Apr. 17, 2017, 3:22 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170416/08190937159/
latest-exploit-dump-shadow-brokers-contains-easy-to-use-windows-exploits-most-already-
patched-microsoft.shtml.
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materials.50 Then, in May of 2017, one of the vulnerabilities included in the 
Shadow Broker’s leaks was used to launch “WannaCry,” a massive, world-
wide cyber-attack.51 The vulnerability was used to spread “ransomware,” a
type of malicious software, which held computers hostage until their owners 
paid the hackers to release them.52 In a further blow to the NSA, researchers 
found signs that the attack was launched by North Korean hackers, using the 
NSA’s own tools, though there was no evidence of North Korean involve-
ment in the original theft of the hacking tools.53 The incident prompted Mi-
crosoft to publicly criticize government stockpiling of vulnerabilities, com-
paring the leak of the NSA tools to the theft of Tomahawk cruise missiles.54
B. The Playpen Cases: Vulnerability Disclosure and 
Criminal Investigations
While the national security side of vulnerability disclosures has re-
ceived the bulk of public and press attention, the issue of government-held 
vulnerabilities has also appeared in a series of criminal cases tied to a 2015 
FBI operation to shut down a child pornography distribution website named 
Playpen. First created in August of 2014, the site had 60,000 member ac-
counts within a month, booming to 215,000 accounts by 2015. 55 Acting on a 
tip from a foreign law enforcement agency, the FBI began to investigate 
Playpen and eventually secured a warrant to seize control of the site’s serv-
er. With the server under their control, the FBI allowed the site to continue 
operation for almost two weeks, between February 20th and March 4th, 
2015, before finally taking it down. During that period the FBI received a 
second warrant authorizing it to send malware (called a “Network Investiga-
50. See Scott Shane et al., Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. 
to Its Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/
nsa-shadow-brokers.html.
51. See Ian Sherr, WannaCry Ransomware: Everything You Need to Know,
CNET (May 19, 2017, 12:29 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/wannacry-wannacrypt-uiwix-ransomware-everything-you-need-
to-know/.
52. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, In Computer Attacks, Clues Point to Fre-
quent Culprit: North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/
15/us/nsa-hacking-shadow-brokers.html.
53. Id.
54. Brad Smith, The Need For Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe Online: 
Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES
(May 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-
urgent-collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/?tduid=
(29c8620bd207948d693e858a037b4a00)(256380)(2459594)(nOD_rLJHOac-
QBTAt391V._e5aR84aLD.Q)()#sm.001c8i11317l0f3vs2f1cm2qoliu3?ranMID=24542&ranE
AID=nOD%2FrLJHOac&ranSiteID=nOD_rLJHOac-QBTAt391V._e5aR84aLD.Q.
55. Joseph Cox, The FBI’s ‘Unprecedented’ Hacking Campaign Targeted 
Over a Thousand Computers, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 4, 2016, 4:00 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-
targeted-over-a-thousand-computers.
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tion Technique” (NIT)) through the site to anyone who visited the site.56 It is 
believed the NIT exploited a vulnerability in the code of the Firefox Brows-
er, as bundled within the Tor Browser (a browser used to surf the web 
anonymously).57 Any computer that visited Playpen would be infected with 
the NIT, which was able to search infected computers for identifying infor-
mation, including the computers’ IP addresses. 58 Once investigators ob-
tained the IP addresses, they subpoenaed ISPs to learn the names and ad-
dresses of the individuals associated with the given IPs. They secured search 
warrants for those individuals and carried out numerous searches and sei-
zures.59 Overall, the Playpen investigation was a massive success, leading to 
350 arrests, as well as the prosecution of 25 producers of child pornography, 
51 hands-on abusers, and the identification or rescue of 55 children in the 
US alone.60
As the Playpen cases came to trial, however, questions began to arise 
about the NIT itself. Defendants and their attorneys wanted to know more 
about the malware that had been used to identify them. United States v. 
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash.), a case in the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, became a focal point of the issue, as the Defendant 
fought for the chance to examine the code of the NIT. Michaud, a former 
school district administration worker, was arrested after the NIT gave the 
FBI evidence that he had accessed the Playpen site.61 In court, the Judge 
showed an inclination toward disclosure, commenting at one point that, 
“much of the details of this information is lost on me, I am afraid, the tech-
nical parts of it, but it comes down to a simple thing. . . . You say you 
caught me by the use of computer hacking, so how do you do it? How do 
you do it? A fair question.”62 After hearing arguments from both sides, the 
court had to admit it was trapped in a catch-22, noting, “the defendant has 
the right to review the full N.I.T. code, but the government does not have to 
produce it[.]”63
56. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, EFF, https://www.eff.org/pages/
playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions#whathappened (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
57. Id.
58. See ‘Playpen’ Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FBI (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See Cyrus Farivar, Feds May Let Playpen Child Porn Suspect Go to Keep Conceal-
ing Their Source Code, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 9, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/01/feds-may-let-playpen-child-porn-suspect-go-to-keep-concealing-their-source-
code/.
62. Joseph Cox, Transcript Shows Why a Judge Ordered the FBI to Reveal Its Mass 
Hacking Malware, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 24, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/transcript-shows-why-a-judge-ordered-the-fbi-to-reveal-mass-hacking-malware-
playpen-jay-michaud.
63. Order on Procedural History and Case Status in Advance of May 25, 2016 Hearing 
at 5, United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2016).
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Michaud’s defense highlighted the fact that in a similar 2013 case, the 
FBI had been extremely cooperative in revealing details on a different 
NIT.64 After continued debate the District Court finally ruled that the evi-
dence based on the NIT was inadmissible.65 While the US Attorney pursued 
an appeal of that order with the Ninth Circuit, the FBI classified “portions of 
the tool, the exploits used in connection with the tool, and some of the oper-
ational aspects of the tool.”66 In December of 2016 the government dropped 
the appeal citing “further review within the Department of Justice [of] the 
Court’s order and the record in the case.”67 Finally, in March of 2017 the 
government dismissed the indictment, stating it had to “choose between dis-
closure of classified information and dismissal of [the] indictment,” and 
given that “disclosure is not currently an option,” the case had to be 
dropped.68
Given that the NIT in question involved their product, Mozilla, the 
creators of the Firefox browser, sought to intervene in the Michaud case. 
Following the Court’s first order compelling the government to provide the 
code of the NIT, Mozilla filed a motion to intervene or appear as amicus cu-
riae in relation to the government’s motion to reconsider.69 Citing reason to 
believe the NIT’s exploit involved “a previously unknown and potentially 
still active vulnerability” in Firefox, Mozilla argued the vulnerability could 
put the security of millions of users at risk, and they asked the court to order 
the government to disclose the vulnerability to it before turning it over to
the defendant.70 In their brief Mozilla also noted that the government had 
refused to tell it if the vulnerability in question had gone through the VEP.71
In the end, the Court denied the motion, effectively telling Mozilla to seek 
answers from the government directly.72 Unable to gain information about 
the vulnerability in their product via the courts, Mozilla chose to put its 
64. Declaration of Matthew Miller at 4, United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-
05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2016).
65. Order Denying Dismissal and Excluding Evidence at 1, United States v. Jay 
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016).
66. Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Compel at 22 n.8, United States 
v. Gerald Andrew Darby, No. 2:16cr36 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2016).
67. Motion of the United States for Voluntary Dismissal of its Appeal at 3-4, United 
States v. Michaud, No. 16-30163 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2016).
68. Government’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice at 2, 
United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2017).
69. Mozilla’s Motion to Intervene or Appear as Amicus Curiae in Relation to Govern-
ment’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Order on the Third Motion to Compel, United 
States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2016).
70. Id. at 1. 
71. Id. at 7 n. 9. 
72. See Seung Lee, FBI Doesn’t Have to Give Mozilla Details On Bug It Used to Bust a 
Child Porn Ring, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016, 6:22 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/fbi-
doesnt-have-give-mozilla-details-bug-it-used-bust-child-porn-ring-461325.
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weight behind efforts to reform the VEP and create legislation to guide the 
process.73
The issues that arose in Michaud illustrate how government uses of 
software vulnerabilities can stretch beyond national security and how the 
secretive way the government has chosen to deal with vulnerabilities can 
cost it convictions in criminal cases. Whenever vulnerabilities are exploited 
to gain evidence in a criminal case, the government runs the risk of hitting 
the same wall it did in Michaud. Defendants will argue that information 
about the vulnerability is material to their defense, leaving the government 
to “disclose or dismiss.”74 This opens the door to a version of what is called 
“graymail” in national security prosecutions—a situation where a potential 
criminal defendant threatens to expose sensitive classified information if 
they are prosecuted.75 Though the exact decision-making process behind the 
choice has yet to come to light, when the government refuses to release in-
formation on a vulnerability, they are making a choice: secrecy over law en-
forcement.
III.  Making New Vulnerabilities—Backdoors and 
San Bernardino
For decades the government has sought to create vulnerabilities where 
there once were none—all in the name of national security. These software 
“backdoors”—intentional weaknesses in a piece of technology or soft-
ware—are designed to allow authorities to bypass security features.76 The 
recent boom in encryption capabilities has led some in the government to 
call for controls on just how secure a developer can make their product, lest 
they prevent law enforcement from gaining access.77 While discussions of 
encryption are not always directly connected to discussions of vulnerability 
disclosure, history and recent events show that many of the same issues 
arise in the context of backdoors.
The first major battle over encryption backdoors came in the 1990s, a 
period that has come to be known in technology policy circles as the “Cryp-
73. See Denelle Dixon, Improving Internet Security Through Vulnerability Disclosure,
MOZILLA BLOG (May 17, 2017), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2017/05/17/improving-internet-
security-vulnerability-disclosure/.
74. Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Net-
work Investigative Techniques, LAWFARE (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques.
75. Arjun Chandran, Note, The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of 
Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner, 64 DUKE L.J. 1411, 1415 
(2015).
76. See Lisa A. Hayes, Strong Encryption Wins Again, Time to End the Debate on 
Government Backdoors, CDT (Mar. 29, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/strong-encryption-wins-
again-time-to-end-the-debate-on-government-backdoors/.
77. See, e.g., Comey, supra note 20.
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to Wars.”78 In 1993, with personal computers and the internet proliferating 
at an ever-increasing rate, the Clinton administration announced the creation 
of the “Clipper Chip,” a microchip intended to be inserted into consumer 
telephones.79 The chip was promised to provide consumers with secure en-
crypted communications while preserving government access to unencrypt-
ed versions of those communications.80 The chip worked by requiring two 
separate cryptographic keys to decrypt any communication, a style of sys-
tem known as “key escrow.”81 These keys would be held by two separate 
government agencies, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) and the Treasury Department, who would only release those keys to 
law enforcement with “lawful authorization.”82 Industry groups moved 
quickly to criticize the proposal, as did civil liberties organizations. While 
the proposal did not require industry to include the chips in their devices, 
many in industry saw the move as the first step toward greater restrictions 
on encryption in the future.83 By 1994, public opinion was against the chip 
as well, with a CNN/TIME poll finding 80% of Americans opposed.84 The 
chip was finally killed when, later that year, a computer scientist was able to 
demonstrate that with a “brute force” attack, a user could override the tech-
nology that allowed law enforcement to surveil communications using the 
chip—making the backdoor useless.85 For the time being, it seemed, encryp-
tion was protected.
The current debate over encryption and government backdoors is part of 
the greater debate over government surveillance launched by Edward 
Snowden’s 2013 exposure of expansive NSA surveillance programs. The 
reaction by the tech industry was almost immediate—in 2014 Google and 
Apple both introduced default encryption in their smartphone operating sys-
tems.86 At the same time, law enforcement and intelligence agencies began 
to once again broach the subject of limitations on encryption. In an October 
16, 2014 speech at the Brookings Institute, then FBI Director James Comey 
spoke about such limits, saying that the FBI often had “the legal authority to 
intercept and access communications and information pursuant to court or-
ders,” but “often lacked the technical ability to do so.”87 He went on to say 
that the FBI needed “assistance and cooperation from companies to comply 
with lawful court orders,” and that the private sector needed to “take a step 
back,” pause, and “consider changing course” when it came to ever-
78. KEHL ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id.
86. Miller, supra note 19. 
87. Comey, supra note 20.
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increasing encryption.88 A few months later, then NSA Director Mike Rog-
ers, in a question-and-answer session with technology policy experts, sup-
ported the creation of built-in government access, saying backdoors would
not “fatally compromise encryption” or limit international markets for US 
products (two major concerns of backdoor opponents).89 Despite such high-
level discussions, it would take a tragic mass shooting to bring the debate 
into the public consciousness.
A. Apple, the FBI, and San Bernardino
On December 2, 2015, a married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and 
Tashfeen Malik, attacked a holiday party in San Bernardino, California, kill-
ing 14 people. Farook and Malik were killed by the police after a high-speed 
chase.90 Amongst the evidence collected by the FBI in the aftermath of the 
shooting was Farook’s employer-issued iPhone, which had been locked with 
a numeric passcode.91 One of the iPhone’s built-in security features, an auto-
erase function, had also been enabled, which would destroy the encryption 
key after 10 failed attempts to unlock the device, rendering the information 
on the phone forever inaccessible.92 In an effort to recover any information 
that could be on the phone, the FBI sought a court order to compel Apple to 
create for it a custom piece of software to circumvent the phone’s security.93
The program would reboot the phone while bypassing or disabling the auto-
erase function, allowing the FBI to then use another program to rapidly 
guess the passcode.94 A federal magistrate granted the order, though Apple 
appealed, beginning a very public legal battle between the company and the 
government.95 In its motion to vacate the order, Apple rebuked the govern-
ment’s claim that this was a one-time request, and argued that they believed 
the backdoor the order would create was “too dangerous to build.”96 Indeed, 
88. Id.
89. McCarthy, supra note 21. 
90. Richard Winton, We May Never Know Why the San Bernardino Terrorists Target-
ed a Christmas Party. Here’s What We Do Know, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016, 7:55 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-bernardino-attack-20161202-story.html.
91. Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist 
Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1-2, In the Matter of the Search 
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus 
IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
92. Id. at 3.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Tracey Lien et al., Court Order in San Bernardino Case Could Force Apple to 
Jeopardize Phone Security, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016, 1:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-apple-san-bernardino-security-20160217-story.html; Jonathan Chew, 
This is Apple’s Next Move in Its Fight With the FBI, FORTUNE, (March 2, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/apple-appeal-fbi-iphone.
96. See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents 
in Search, And Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 2, In the Matter 
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at the same time the government was seeking Apple’s assistance in the San 
Bernardino case, it was also attempting to get the company to unlock at least 
nine other iPhones in unrelated cases.97 Apple’s CEO Tim Cook signaled 
that the company intended to fight the issue for as long as it could, and ex-
pressed concern that the order was an overreach of government power that 
would undermine “the very freedoms and liberty” that the government was 
meant to protect.98 In response, the government filed a motion to compel, in 
which it accused Apple of opposing the order as a publicity stunt.99 Despite 
these heated words, a little over a month after Apple filed its appeal, the
government dropped the issue entirely.100 The FBI, in cooperation with a 
third party, had been able to circumvent the iPhone’s security and thus no 
longer needed the order. In a statement the US Attorney, Eileen Decker, was 
emphatic that the “decision to conclude the litigation was based solely on 
the fact that, with the assistance of a third party, we are now able to unlock 
that iPhone without compromising any information in the phone.”101 It was 
later revealed that the FBI had paid a computer security expert $900,000 to 
crack the phone’s encryption.102 In April of 2016 the FBI released a further 
statement where they said they would not submit the vulnerability used to 
access the phone to the VEP, because it had been discovered by a third par-
ty, and the FBI had not purchased “the rights to technical details about how 
the method functions, or the nature and extent of any vulnerability upon 
which the method may rely in order to operate.”103 Later attempts by the 
media to force the FBI to release more detailed information about the vul-
nerability finally failed in October of 2017, when a federal judge dismissed 
of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black 
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016).
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iPhones, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
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98. See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
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iPhone, GIZMODO (May 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-fbi-paid-900-000-to-
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(Apr. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/fbi-apple-iphone-crack/.
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the FOIA lawsuit, upholding the FBI’s claim that revealing the identity of 
the vendor could lead to that entity being attacked and could lead to the un-
authorized disclosure of the vulnerability, damaging national security.104
The San Bernardino case illuminates not only the debate over back-
doors but also the limits of the VEP. Unlike the issues surrounding 
WannaCry or Heartbleed, where the vulnerabilities remained mostly secret 
until exploited by bad actors or exposed by whistleblowers, this vulnerabil-
ity was publicly known and clearly effective—at least effective enough for 
the government to drop their case against Apple once it became available. 
Yet, despite knowing there was a potentially dangerous and exploitable er-
ror in the iPhone’s encryption software, the FBI was able to stop the vulner-
ability from even entering the VEP.
IV.  Proposed Solutions—The New VEP, 
Legislation, and Beyond
Given the myriad of competing interests and agendas involved in the 
debate over vulnerability disclosure (as well as the debate over government 
backdoors), any proposal to move the conversation forward faces a difficult 
fight. Any solution has to appease both government agencies looking to pre-
serve investigative and tactical capabilities and companies seeking to pro-
tect their products and customers. Given how central computer systems are 
to the functioning of society, vulnerabilities will remain dangerous and val-
uable for the foreseeable future, making any resolution that even partially 
satisfies the parties involved something worth pursuing. In recent years 
there have been proposals from many corners, including the Executive 
Branch, Congress, and technology policy advocates from both civil society 
and industry, and an evaluation of these proposals is vital in any attempt to 
plot a future course.
A. A New VEP
As part of the fallout from the Heartbleed incident, some security re-
searchers raised the alarm about the need for public disclosure of vulnerabil-
ities discovered by the government. After reviewing various government 
operations that exploited vulnerabilities, it became clear to them the gov-
ernment was sitting on a worrisome stockpile—why else would the gov-
ernment be willing to “burn” four zero-day vulnerabilities in a single mis-
sion, as was done in the Stuxnet attack, a joint US/Israeli cyber assault on 
the Iranian nuclear program?105 Once used, zero-day vulnerabilities would 
most likely become public and, therefore, patched in short order, so it 
seemed unlikely the government would expend them so readily if its stock-
104. See Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 2017).
105. See Schneier, supra note 1. 
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pile was extremely limited.106 Yet the government denied the existence of 
any stockpile and maintained that not disclosing a vulnerability was the ex-
ception, not the rule for the government.107 In an interview with Wired, Na-
tional Security Council cybersecurity coordinator Michael Daniel avoided 
directly answering the question of whether that default rule extended to ze-
ro-day vulnerabilities discovered by third parties, saying that if the govern-
ment thought it was a significant threat, it would move to get the vulnerabil-
ity patched.108
In 2017, in the wake of the 2010 VEP document’s release and in re-
sponse to the WannaCry attack, voices in civil society and the technology 
industry launched another round of calls for further action on vulnerabili-
ties. Industry players like Mozilla109 and Microsoft,110 both of which had 
seen the negative aspects of government use of vulnerabilities, cited the 
WannaCry attack as impetus for changes in policy. Microsoft went as far as 
to call for a “Digital Geneva Convention” that would bind world govern-
ments to report vulnerabilities.111 Similar calls for reform came from civil 
society groups like EFF, which pushed for Congressional action (discussed 
further below).112 In October of 2017 the White House Cybersecurity Coor-
dinator Rob Joyce announced that the White House was preparing to release 
new information on the VEP, leading to the release of an updated VEP on 
November 15, 2017.113
The updated VEP provides greater detail on the considerations that go 
into cases where law enforcement or intelligence interests override the bene-
fits of disclosure. The new policy includes a series of “core considerations”
that are supplied to help decision makers “weigh the benefits to U.S. nation-
al security and national interest” when deciding whether or not to disclose 
or rescript knowledge of a vulnerability. These considerations are:
106. See id.
107. Kim Zetter, U.S. Gov Insists It Doesn’t Stockpile Zero-Day Exploits to Hack Ene-
mies, WIRED (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/michael-daniel-no-
zero-day-stockpile/.
108. Se id. 
109. See Denelle Dixon, WannaCry is a Cry for VEP Reform, MOZILLA BLOG (May 15, 
2017), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2017/05/15/wannacry-cry-vep-reform/.
110. Smith, supra note 54. 
111. Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT 
ON THE ISSUES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-
digital-geneva-convention/#sm.0001gnysbhjsod01z7q11hvz0xg2d.
112. See, e.g., Andrew Crocker & Kate Tummarello, Congress’ Imperfect Start to 
Addressing Vulnerabilities, EFF (May 24, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2017/05/congress-imperfect-start-addressing-vulnerabilities.
113. 2017 VEP, supra note 17; Michelle Richardson & Mike Godwin, What the White 
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SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46647/white-house-disclose-process-
revealing-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities/.
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Part 1—Defensive Equity Considerations
1. A. Threat Considerations
Where is the product used? How widely is it used?
How broad is the range of products or versions affected?
Are threat actors likely to exploit this vulnerability, if it were 
known to them?
1. B. Vulnerability Considerations
What access must a threat actor possess to exploit this vulnera-
bility?
Is exploitation of this vulnerability alone sufficient to cause 
harm?
How likely is it that threat actors will discover or acquire 
knowledge of this vulnerability?
1. C. Impact Considerations
How much do users rely on the security of the product?
How severe is the vulnerability? What are the potential conse-
quences of the exploitation of this vulnerability?
What access or benefit does a threat actor gain by exploiting 
this vulnerability?
What is the likelihood that adversaries will reverse engineer a 
patch, discover the vulnerability and use it against unpatched 
systems?
Will enough USG [United States Government] information 
systems, U.S. businesses and/or consumers actually install the 
patch to offset the harm to security caused by educating attack-
ers about the vulnerability?
1. D. Mitigation Considerations
Can the product be configured to mitigate this vulnerability? 
Do other mechanisms exist to mitigate the risks from this vul-
nerability?
Are impacts of this vulnerability mitigated by existing best -
practice guidance, standard configurations, or security practic-
es?
If the vulnerability is disclosed, how likely is it that the vendor 
or another entity will develop and release a patch or update that 
effectively mitigates it?
If a patch or update is released, how likely is it to be applied to 
vulnerable systems? How soon? What percentage of vulnerable 
Fall 2018] The Secrets We Keep 123
systems will remain forever unpatched or unpatched for more 
than a year after the patch is released?
Can exploitation of this vulnerability by threat actors be detect-
ed by USG or other members of the defensive community?
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Part 2—Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and 
Operational Equity Considerations
2. A. Operational Value Considerations
Can this vulnerability be exploited to support intelligence col-
lection, cyber operations, or law enforcement evidence collec-
tion?
What is the demonstrated value of this vulnerability for intelli-
gence collection, cyber operations, and/or law enforcement ev-
idence collection?
What is its potential (future) value?
What is the operational effectiveness of this vulnerability?
2. B. Operational Impact Considerations
Does exploitation of this vulnerability provide specialized op-
erational value against cyber threat actors or their operations? 
Against high-priority National Intelligence Priorities Frame-
work (NIPF) or military targets? For protection of warfighters 
or civilians?
Do alternative means exist to realize the operational benefits of 
exploiting this vulnerability?
Would disclosing this vulnerability reveal any intelligence 
sources or methods?
Part 3—Commercial Equity Considerations
If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed, 
what risks could that pose for USG relationships with industry?
Part 4—International Partnership Equity Considerations
If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed, 
what risks could that pose for USG international relations?114
This list is much more extensive than what was included in the White 
House’s 2014 statement, and the new VEP has received positive, if re-
114. Id.
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strained, reviews from groups like the ACLU.115 The new policy still ex-
empts vulnerabilities that are subject to non-disclosure agreements—which 
are common in cases dealing with third-party discovered vulnerabilities (as 
in the San Bernardino case).116 Likewise, the Equities Review Board, while 
including civilian departments like the Departments of State, Treasury, and 
Commerce, excludes both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).117 This is notable, given the 
FCC’s role in regulating the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure and 
the FTC’s mission to protect privacy and data security.118 Given the increas-
ing attention paid to connected vehicles, the Department of Transportation 
would seem to be a natural fit for a permanent seat on the board as well.119
Yet even with these criticisms, some of the changes to the VEP were close 
to those requested by civil society organizations,120 though time will tell if 
the VEP can deliver the outcomes those organizations desire when put into 
practice.
B. Congressional Fixes
Both the previous VEP and its 2017 version are products of the execu-
tive branch. Yet after the WannaCry attack, Congress began to take interest 
in the process—starting with the “Protect our Ability to Counter Hacking 
Act” (PATCH Act).121 The PATCH Act would codify the VEP process and 
the Equities Review Board (ERB).122 Unlike the 2017 VEP, the act would 
put the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than the Director of the 
NSA, in charge of the ERB, though it only gives seats to the Secretaries of 
State, Treasury, and Energy, as well as to representatives of the FTC, on an 
as-needed basis.123 The PATCH Act would also place the ERB under yearly 
Congressional oversight, via a yearly report to the relevant committees, and
require unclassified public versions of that report to be released. The 
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PATCH Act also gained support from Mozilla, who found that the act in-
cluded many of the key reforms to the VEP system that it had been pushing 
for.124
While civil society organizations and industry were encouraged by the 
introduction of the PATCH Act, they also had reservations. The EFF took 
exception to the exclusion from the VEP of classified vulnerabilities that are 
“inappropriately released to the public,” which would allow the government 
to keep vulnerabilities like Heartbleed secret even after a public leak.125 Fur-
ther criticism was directed at the fact that, like the 2017 VEP, the PATCH 
Act also excluded third-party discovered vulnerabilities.126 Despite the atten-
tion paid to the act by industry and advocates, the Act, though introduced in 
May of 2017, has yet to move any further through the legislative process.127
V.  A Hybrid Solution to the Vulnerability Disclosure Issue
Given the flurry of activity and debate over vulnerability disclosures 
over the past few years, there are a number of viable solutions to the issue 
that could be attractive to industry, government, and advocates alike. How-
ever, given the diversity in thought among those groups, and the differing 
weight they give to considerations of national security, keeping private, 
governmental, and civil society actors engaged in active policy-making, it 
becomes difficult to create an effective final policy. A solid foundation for 
the new vulnerability disclosure schema can be found in the 2017 VEP and 
the PATCH Act. As discussed in Part III, both of these received a mix of 
praise and criticism from players in the technology policy world, and thus 
any new system derived from the PATCH Act or the 2017 VEP will be a 
creature of compromise.
The PATCH Act represents the most important aspect of any VEP re-
form—the codification of the process into law. Rather than depending on 
the Executive Branch to write its own rules for vulnerabilities, Congress 
needs to be involved. The PATCH Act’s oversight requirements of yearly 
reports, including public reports, will ensure the process is kept under a 
watchful eye. A useful addition, first proposed in a 2016 paper by two for-
mer Obama Administration cybersecurity officers and included in the 
PATCH Act, is further oversight by the Inspector General of the given de-
partment charged with chairing the ERB, along with expanding the mission 
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which is al-
ready tasked with reviewing the actions of intelligence agencies, to include 
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oversight of the VEP.128 Given the sensitive nature of the VEP’s operations, 
oversight by a group like PCLOB allows for a level of operational secrecy 
while still ensuring independent oversight.
The 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act each structure the ERB differently, 
and a hybrid of the two is needed to better address current differences. The 
2017 VEP’s membership list should serve as the basis, as it includes im-
portant civilian departments like State, Treasury, and Commerce. Addition-
ally, representatives from the FCC and FTC should be granted permanent 
seats on the board, given the missions and expertise of those agencies. The 
PATCH Act’s transfer of the Executive Secretariat from the NSA to the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) is a vital change from the VEP, as 
DHS has significant experience and expertise in coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure programs (which evolved from the work of CERT-CC, men-
tioned above).129 This also takes control of the board out of the hands of an 
agency dedicated to intelligence gathering and puts it into the hands of 
DHS, an agency tasked with a wider portfolio of interests.
While it is not necessary to codify the exact criteria for evaluating vul-
nerabilities, the equity considerations found in the 2017 VEP should provide 
the base of the ERB’s thought process. Those considerations touch on a 
wide swath of the issues the ERB will have to face, including:
Details on the product in question—the extent of its use and 
who might exploit the vulnerability if it became known;
How likely it is that other actors will discover the vulnerability 
and exploit it;
The severity of the threat and the potential to mitigate the vul-
nerability;
The value of the vulnerability as a law enforcement or intelli-
gence tool; and
The effect the revelation of US government knowledge of the 
vulnerability will have on US government relationships with 
industry and international relationships.
These are deeply important questions in any discussion of vulnerability dis-
closure and need to be part of any hybrid VEP/PATCH system.
Controls over any stockpiling of vulnerabilities will also be a necessary 
component of a hybrid solution. Both the 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act 
provide for periodic review of those vulnerabilities that are chosen to be 
kept secret—with the VEP adopting yearly review. Yet both the 2017 VEP 
and the PATCH Act allow the government to circumvent the VEP process 
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when the vulnerability is subject to a non-disclosure agreement (as in San 
Bernardino) or when the vulnerability’s existence is made public via a leak 
of information (as in WannaCry). These provisions must be eliminated from 
the proposed hybrid solution. When a third party approaches the govern-
ment with a vulnerability, the government should be compelled to run that 
vulnerability through the VEP. A strong VEP has the potential to increase 
confidence in the government’s ability to responsibly handle vulnerabilities, 
and allowing it to be circumvented via non-disclosure agreements derails 
that progress. Likewise, once a vulnerability is made public via a leak or a 
cyber-attack, the ERB should move to release what information they have to 
any government agency working to repair the damage or reveal the vulnera-
bility to private companies whose products are under threat. It is clear from 
the lessons of Heartbleed and WannaCry that continued government secrecy 
after a vulnerability becomes public does not end well for the government, 
especially in the court of public opinion.
Any move to reform vulnerability disclosures would be a complicated 
process involving many more interests and actors than those discussed 
above. But a hybrid of the 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act has the oppor-
tunity to bridge the gap between government and private interests, and allow
for greater public confidence in the vulnerability disclosure process. While 
the PATCH Act has not made progress in the current Congress, the imple-
mentation of the new VEP gives supporters of vulnerability disclosure re-
form another opportunity to raise awareness of the issue and push for further 
changes.
C. Other Considerations
While not directly implicated in the VEP or PATCH Act, there are two 
additional areas of interest that could prove useful as leverage in a debate 
over vulnerability disclosure reform. The first is the use of vulnerabilities in 
criminal cases, as in the Playpen investigation. In Michaud, the government 
effectively decided that a set of software vulnerabilities were more im-
portant than the successful prosecution of defendants who had been found to 
be in possession of child pornography. In a 2016 article, Susan Hennessey, 
an expert in national security law and former NSA attorney, along with 
Nicholas Weaver, a computer security expert and UC Berkeley lecturer, 
proposed a new judicial framework for NITs that included in camera review 
of classified information.130 Hennessey and Weaver’s proposal is worthy of 
deeper investigation in a different discussion, but for the purposes of vul-
nerability disclosure reform, it presents an opportunity to clear up the issues 
surrounding NIT cases, retaining them as a viable law enforcement tool, 
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which could entice law enforcement agencies to support reforms to the VEP 
which they may otherwise not favor.131
The second area of potential leverage to build support for vulnerability 
disclosure is the reform of the laws that govern security research. Currently, 
third-party researchers, be they individual white hat hackers or university-
sponsored teams of students, have the potential to run afoul of the CFAA, 
which has never been amended to give a good faith research exception to its 
prohibition on accessing a computer “without authorization.”132 Such a 
change would further open up the world of vulnerability research and give 
both companies and the government access to new sources of vulnerability 
discovery. Laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) also 
have the potential to derail good faith security research, when they bar cir-
cumventing things like access controls on devices, even by the owners of 
said devices.133 Changes to these laws can help protect consumers and could 
even take some pressure off of the government to reveal every vulnerabil-
ity–since there will be an army of researchers also looking for them.
Conclusion
In modern society, software vulnerabilities have become a fact of life. 
Data breaches, malware attacks, and the like have become common news 
stories, and often have real-world implications.134 It is easy to understand 
why law enforcement and intelligence agencies would want to exploit these 
vulnerabilities for their own missions, but such actions will always come at 
a cost. The government’s ability to hide vulnerabilities from developers is a 
threat not only to the security of American citizens, but the security of mil-
lions of users across the world. Reform of the vulnerability disclosure 
scheme is the best opportunity for the government to lead on this issue—and 
by bringing advocates and industry into the fold on designing a new system 
they can preserve national security utility without sacrificing the best inter-
est of the public.
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